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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
be foreseen.1 5 However, the greater number of cases have failed to consider the question of duty and use the language of proximate cause. In
any case, the ultimate question should be whether the negligent act and
the injury which resulted are so related that liability should be imposedla6
The prevailing view, of course, is that one is liable for any injury which results from his negligent act if the injury was the natural and probable result
17
of the negligent act.
It has been held that the proximate cause of the injury in cases similar
to the instant case was not the theft but rather the unskillful handling of
the vehicle by the thief.18 The key in the automobile did no harm. Before
any injury could result there had to be some illegal act of a third person,
and generally one is not bound to anticipate that some person will disobey
the law.1o Even if the automobile owner could have foreseen that his act
of leaving the keys in the automobile would induce a thief to steal the
automobile, certainly one should not say that he was bound to foresee that
the thief would be a careless driver. Such a statement would seem contrary to common experience; it would seem that car thieves, in order to avoid
attention would drive with extreme care. There may be circumstances
however, such as leaving an automobile unlocked with the key in the ignition in front of a school, where one might reasonably anticipate that some
injury could result,20 due to the possibility that the automobile may fall into
the hands of an immature driver.
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The City and County of San Francisco sought to condemn certain property
for the purpose of leasing it for a term of not less than twenty-five years
to a private citizen who was to construct and operate a parking garage
thereon. The City Controller refused to certify to the availability of funds
for this purpose, contending, inter alia, that the proposed use was not a
public one. In a mandamus proceeding by the City the court held, that the
application for the writ be denied. Since the City was to retain no control
over the rates to be charged by the lessee, the proposed use was private
rather than public. City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 279 P.2d 529
(Cal.1955).

15.
Sinram v. Pcnnsylvania Ry. Co., 61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932); Palsgraf v. Long
Island Ry. Co., supra note 12; Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. .197

(1935); Prosser on Torts, 186 n. 95 (1941).
16. Prosser on Torts §§31,45 (1941).
17. Kiste v. Red Cab Co., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E. 2d 395 (1952); Palsgraf
v. Long Island Ry. Co., supra note 12. Contra, Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223,
234 N.W. 372 (1931).
18. Wilson v. Harrington, supra note 2; 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
& Practice, §2534 n.26 (Perm. ed. 1946).
19. Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal. 2d 712, 264 P.2d 1 (1953); Curtiss v. Jacobson, 142
Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947), See Babbitt, The Law Applied to Motor Vehicles §553
(1946); Restatement, Torts, §447 (1934). "There is usually much less reason to anticipate acts which arc malicious or criminal than those which are merely :segligent.
Under ordinary circumstances, it is not to be expected that anyone will :ntentionally
. steal an autoiobile and run a man down with it." Prosser on Torts, §37 11.90 (1941).
20. Restatement, Torts §302 Illus. 7 (1934).
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The power of eminent domain 1 has long been recognized as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty.2 Hence, constitutional provisions relative thereto
are limitations upon, rather than grants of, such power. : North Dakota
statutorily defines eminent domain as "... the right to take private property
for public use." 4 The Code further provides that "Private property shall
not be taken . . . without just compensation." ' 5 Case law reiterates this precept.'
7
Although implied rather than expressed in most state constitutions, it
is the universal rule that private property cannot, in the absence of the
owner's consent, be taken for private use." The law is devoid of similar
uniformity as to what constitutes a public use. The older view that a public use means a use, or a right of use, by the public 9 is discredited by proponents of the more contemporary view that public use is synonymous with
public benefit or advantage.30 One authority, recognizing the hopeless irreconcilability of the decisions, correctly states that there neither is, nor can
he, a concise definition of universal applicability."
In any event, a use is
not private per se. merely because the taking will result incidentally in a
special benefit to particular private individuals.'2 However, in order for the
power to be exercised, it must be clear that the use is predominately public. Even a merger of the public and private interests on a substantially
13
equal basis will not permit the use of the power.
The "liberal" trend of most courts is exemplified by the fact that in the
vast majority of jurisdictions eminent domain proceedings may, in addition
1. The power of eminent domain is to be distinguished from the police power.
See
Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1952); See 1
Lewis, Eminent Domain §6 (3rd ed. 1909); 11 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §32.04 (3rd ed. 1950); 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain §1.42(3) (3rd ed., Sackman &
Van Brunt, 1950).
2.
See State of Georgia v. City of Chatonooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1923); Albert HanLumber Co. v. United States 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1922); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98
ton
U.S. 403,406 (1378).
3.
See Cincinnati v. Louisville etc. R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 403 (1912); United States
v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); United States v. 277.97 Acres of Land, 112 F.Supp.
159, 161 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
4.
N. D. Rev. Code §32-1501 (1943).
5. Ibid.
6.
U.S. v. Wheeler Township, 66 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1933); see Campbell v. Chase
National Bank, 5 F.Supp. 156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
7. The following constitutions are among those expressly prohibiting the taking of
private property for a private use: Ala. Const. Art. I, §23; Ariz. Const. Art. I, §17; ' olo.
Const. Art. II, §14; Mo. Const. Art. I, §26; Okla. Const. Art II, §23; S. C. Const. Art. I
.17; Wash. Const. Art. I, §16; Wy. Const. Art. I, §32.
North Carolina alone has 0o
'onstitutinoal pravisions relative to eminent domain.
8.
Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Cole v. LaGrange,
113 U.S. 1 (1881).
9.
Shasta Power Co. v. Walker, 149 Fed. 568 (C.C.N.D. Cal., 1906); Cleveland
By. Co. v. Polecat Drainage District, 213 I11. 83, 72 N.E. 685 (1904).
10. See Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923); Mt. Vernon-Woodbury etc. Co. v. 1riterstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916).
11.
2 Nichols, op. cit. supra note 1, 7.2(3).
This would seem clear, since the effect
of the contempo'ary majority of the decisions has been to make a definition of the nature
of a use for the benefit of the public more a matter of degree than a legal absolute.
12.
See Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 606, 612 (C.G.M.D. Ala.
1922): In re Condemnation for Improvement of Rouge River, 266 Fed. 105, 114 (C.C.
E.D. Mich. 1920); Sission v. Board of Supervisors, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N.W. 454, 459
(1905) "...
controlling effect' cannot be given the fact . . . that the construction of a
particular improvement will result incidentally in a benefit to private rights and interests.
If the contrary were true, it it (sic) doubtful if there could be prosecuted any public
work requiring an exercise of the power of eminent domain."
13,
See Shizas v. City of Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589, 594 (1952).
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to takings for traditional purposes,1 4 be constitutionally used to acquire land
for such purposes as the effectuation of slum clearance, the promotion of
low-rent housing, 1 5 and the providing of public parking facilities.16 Illustrative of the extreme "public benefit" theory cases are those affirming condemnation of land which, though not a slum area, constituted a "social and
economic" liability to a city because of unsound planning, 17 or mere vacacy.le These decisions have been subjected to criticism,' 9 which has apparently gone unheeded.
It is essential to note that in condemning land for a public purpose, accomplishment of that public purpose is the primary consideration. 20 Consequently, subsequent sale or lease to private persons or corporations of property taken by eminent domain will in no way invalidate the taking unless
2
made prior to the accomplishment of such public purpose. '
In all cases, although legislative declarations relative to a public use are
considered prima facie correct, they are by no means conclusive, and the
2
burden of ultimate determination of the matter falls upon the judiciary.
In the instant case it will be observed that the purpose of the taking
was not to replan, but to eliminate congestion by providing public parking
at reasonable cost. This purpose, however, would have no assurance of fulfillment in veiw of the total absence of public regulation of rates to be
charged for the privilege of parking. It is readily perceivable that a contrary decision could not be logically supported by utilization of any existing statutory or judicial interpretation of the term "public use".

14.

See, e.g., 2 Nichols, op. cit. supra note 11, §7.511-7.5155, 7.5157-7.524.

(For

example, highways, dams, public buildings, railroad, and airports).

15. Keyes v. United States 119 F.2d 444 (D.C.Cir. 1941); Papadinis v. City of
Somerville, 121 N.E.2d 714 (Mass. 1954); Ferch v. Housing Authority of Cass County,
59 N.V.2d 849 (N.D. 1953);

Contra: Housing Authority of City of Atlanta v. Johnson,

209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953).
16. Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 98 A.2d 523 (1953); State ex rel
Hawks v. City of Topeka, 176 Kan. 240, 270 P.2d 270 (1954); State v. Land Clearance
for Redevelopment Authority of Kansas, 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mi.

1954).

17. See e.g., Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal.App.2d 777,
266 P.2d 105 (1954), certioraridenied, 75 Sup. Ct. 214 (1955).
18. Seee.g., People ex rel Gutnecht v. City of Chicago, 414 1l. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626
(1953).
19, Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F.Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953). The court
states, "That the Government may do whatever it deems to be for the good of the people
is not a principle ot our system of government.
Nor can it be, because the ultimate basic
ssential in our system is that individuals have inherent rights, and as to them, the powers
of government are sharply limited .. . . It is said that the established meaning of eminent

domain includes measures for the 'general welfare' and that new social doctrines have so
enlarged the concept of public welfare as to include all measures designed for the public
benefit . . . There is no more subtle means of transforming the basic concepts of our

government, of shifting from the preeminence of individual rights to the preeminence of
government wishes, than is afforded by redefinition of 'general welfare', as that term is
used to define the Government's power of seizure. If it were to be determined that it
includes whatever a commission, authorized by Congress and appointed

by the President,

determines to be in the interest of 'sound government', the ascendancy of government over
the individual right of property will be complete." Id. at 716, 720.*
20. The theory of the courts in the slum clearance and similar type cases is that condemnation promotes the elimination of a social evil, resulting in a consequent benefit to
the public. Seee.g., Thomas v. Housing Redevelopment Authority, 234 Minn. 221, 48
N.W.2d 175 (1951).
21. Velishka v. City of Nashua, 106 A.2d 571 (N.H. 1954); David Jeffrey Co. v.
City of Milwaukee, 66 N.W.2d 362 (Wis. 1954).
22. See City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930); Sears v. Akron, 246
U.S. 242, 251 (1918).

RECENT CASES
The policy reflected by the instant case in refusing to uphold a use clearly not public and in restricting an even greater expansion of the "public
use" concept is encouraging to that ever diminishing minority which remains steadfast in its dedication to the proposition that individual rights
are of far greater and more lasting worth than governmental aid. "The
law of each age is ultimately what that age thinks should be the law." 23
That the courts, with certain notable exceptions, have made the most perspicacious choice in the field of eminent domain is open to question.

H. M.

PIPPIN

CONTRACTS PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL - CHARITABLE SUBSCIUPTIONS. Plaintiff signed as guarantor several notes of a hospital building association, blank except for amount, so that it might make loans and secure
building contracts.
The association, relying on plaintiff's promise, had
entered into the contracts when plaintiff became dissatisfied with the type
of hospital being built, and demanded back the unused notes. The association refused to return them. In an action to enjoin negotiation of the notes
judgment was entered for the defendants. On appeal it was held, that the
judgment be affirmed. Plaintiff's promise of guaranty became binding
when the charity, in reliance thereon, put itself into a position from which
it could not extricate itself without substantial injury.1 Danby v. Osteopathic Hospital Association, 104 A.2d 903 (Delaware 1954).
The early English and American cases regarded promises of money madeto charitable organizations as nudum pactum since the very nature of the
undertaking indicates a gift with no expectation of consideration. 2 Later
decisions, however, have tended to enforce the promises whenever possible
as a matter of policy.3 Courts have sought refuge in a variety of theories
in order that they might find consideration. 4 Some courts have found a
consideration in the donee's "promise" to apply the subscriptions to the
purposes of the institution. 5 Others hvae considered the promise as a unilateral offer which becomes binding as soon as the subscription has beep
accepted and liabilities incurred by the charity, 6 and a few courts have held
that the promise of each subscriber is consideration for the promise of the

23. See People ex rel Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 450, 130 N.E.
601, 608 (1921).
1. The doctrine of promissory estoppel invoked by the court has been defined as. "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise."
Restatement, Contracts §90 (1933).
2. Phillips, Limerick Academy v. Davis, 11 Mass. 113(1814); See 1 Williston on Contracts 403(Rev. ed. 1936).
3. In re Lord's Will, 175 Misc. 921, 25 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1941); More Game Birds in
America Inc. v. Boettger, 125 N.J.L. 97, 14 A.2d 778(1940).
4. At least one early case held that a moral obligation was sufficient. Caul v. Gibson,
3 Pa. St. 416(18i6).
5. Rogers v. Galloway Female College, 64 Ark. 627, 44 S.W. 454(1898); Rothenberger v. Glick, 22 Ind. App. '288, 52 N.E. 811 ,1899); Albert Lea College v. Brown, 88
Minn. 524, 93 N.W. 672(1903).
6, I & I Holding Corporation v. Gainsburg, 276 N.Y. 427, 12 N.E.2d 532(1938);
Kueka College v. Ray, 167 N.Y. 96, 60 N.E. 325(1901); See In re Lord's Will, 175 Mcsi.
921, 25 N.Y.S.2d 747,751 (1941).

